Abstract There are nowadays over 1 million Portuguese who lack a primary care physician. By applying a discrete choice experiment to a large representative sample of Portuguese junior doctors (N = 503) in 2014, we provide an indication that this shortage may be addressed with a careful policy design that mixes pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives for these junior physicians. According to our simulations, a policy that includes such incentives may increase uptake of general practitioners (GPs) in rural areas from 18% to 30%. Marginal wages estimated from our model are realistic and close to market prices: an extra hour of work would require an hourly wage of 16.5€; moving to an inland rural setting would involve an increase in monthly income of 1.150€ (almost doubling residents' current income); a shift to a GP career would imply an 849€ increase in monthly income. Additional opportunities to work outside the National Health Service overcome an income reduction of 433€. Our simulation predicts that an income increase of 350€ would lead to a 3 percentage point increase in choice probability, which implies an income elasticity of 3.37, a higher estimation compared to previous studies.
Introduction
Economists have been arguing for decades over the forces that drive medical specialty choice and practice location [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Nevertheless, disparities across different medical specialties, and in the geographical distribution of physicians, exist both in low- [6] [7] [8] and high-income countries [9] [10] [11] [12] , and strategies to overcome them have been largely ineffective [13] [14] [15] .
Data from a large prospective study on human resources needs for the Portuguese Health System shows that, overall, the total number of physicians suits the Portuguese needs for the next decade, yet specific medical specialties and geographic regions may remain underserved [16] . Considering the increasing burden of chronic disease, primary care stands out as an area of particular concern: the number of general practitioners (GPs) 1 had a net decrease of 14 percentage points (p.p.) in the last decade; more than 50% of the total number of specialists is over 50 years old; and the number of GP residents (medical doctors who are in a GP specialist training program) is 80% lower than the total number of GP specialists [16, 17] . Correia 
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pedrosaldanharamos@live.com.pt [18] also found that, despite the increase in the number of doctors between 1996 and 2007 in Portugal, the overall inequality in geographic distribution has not decreased. Particularly, physicians are located disproportionately in the main metropolises, namely in Porto, Coimbra, and Lisbon, whereas the regions of Alentejo, Algarve and inland North stand out as less covered areas. The map in Fig. 1 makes this issue of shortage of doctors in these areas explicit. 2 Over the last decades, several policies have been put forward in Portugal with the explicit goal of attracting doctors to underserved areas, specifically in primary care. 3 For some time, the main focus was directed towards inland rural areas, which are usually regarded as ''medical deserts''. Nonetheless, there is also international evidence that rural outer bands on the periphery of metropolitan areas, which are usually ''dormitory towns'' for the population working in the city, should also be areas of particular concern due to the sudden increase in their populations [21, 22] . To our knowledge, there is no published work on the effects of these successive policies in Portugal, but the persistence of this problem is arguably the best evidence that they have had only a minor impact, at best.
Like Portugal, Spain also has differences in physician density of more than two times between provinces [23] ; Switzerland exhibits differences of two to six times between cantons [24] ; and inequity in the distribution of GPs in the UK has increased compared to levels three decades ago [25] .
There is a vast plethora of research that identifies the factors behind these imbalances in junior doctors' specialty choice and practice location. Although expected future income is thought to play an important role in determining specialty and location choice [4, [26] [27] [28] , recent evidence points towards the importance of non-pecuniary factors, such as out-of-hours workload [29, 30] , opportunities to undertake non-National Health Service work [31] and academic and procedural work [32] . ''Rural upbringing'' [33] or rural exposure during medical school or medical residency [3, 34, 35] is specifically thought to increase the probability of practicing in peripheral areas.
In this paper, we use a representative sample of Portuguese junior doctors who have not yet chosen their medical specialty and residency placement, in order to bring new evidence over the determinants of medical specialty and practice location choice. We further use our estimates to simulate government interventions aimed at increasing the uptake of junior family doctors in rural settings.
In line with previous studies [29, 30, 32] , we use a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to identify the Portuguese junior doctors' preference structure. Although DCEs are becoming increasingly used to elicit preferences in health economics, there are still few studies on junior doctors' preferences in high-income countries and, to our knowledge, only one has been performed in Europe [36] . Nonetheless, we are the first to combine stated-preference with revealed-preference data to simulate policies that recruit physicians for rural areas; since we jointly model both the choice of specialty (hospitalbased vs GP) and location practice, we provide more realistic estimates for simulating rural uptake of GPs. Furthermore, we use a set of socio-demographic and medical education variables for understanding sub-group behaviors, thus providing guidance for tailored policies. To our knowledge, this is the largest study on medical education in Portugal to date and will hopefully help guide future policies that wish to reduce physician density inequalities.
The Portuguese context
Young Portuguese students who wish to pursue a medical career have a long path ahead of them: it starts with enrollment for a Degree in Medicine (a 6-year undergraduate course), which is then followed by a medical residency (composed of a general residency year and a specialty residency program).
Portugal has eight different public medical schools spread across the country. There are two schools in the Lisbon, two others in Porto and one in Coimbra-these are the three largest cities in Portugal. During the last 15 years, three more were created: one in Braga, in the North of Portugal, another in Covilhã, a smaller city located in a rural inland context in the central region of Portugal, and, finally, one more in the Algarve, a rural region in the South of the country. Currently, around 1800 students enroll in these eight courses each year.
After graduating from medical school, young doctors undertake a National Medical Exam, which is mandatory for accessing post-graduate medical residency programs. Soon after this exam, young medical doctors start a 1-year general residency program in a hospital they select according to their Medical School grade point average (GPA). During this year, they are employed by the NHS and complete rotations in Internal Medicine, Surgery, Pediatrics, Primary Care and Public Health in the hospital they chose.
At the end of this general residency, junior doctors choose their medical specialty and residency location. The 2 In this hyperlink we provide an animated visualization with the population-adjusted geographic dispersion of medical doctors in Portugal, according to their medical specialty. (http://public.tableau. com/profile/pedro.jorge.saldanha.ramos#!/vizhome/DispersoGeogrfi cadeMdicos/Planilha1). Data Source: Health Human Resources Database, Statistics Portugal, 2011. 3 Some legal documents that have enforced these policies are [19, 20]. candidates are ranked according to the score on the National Medical Exam (i.e., the medical doctors who achieve the highest score in the exam are the first to choose, and ties are decided using the Medical School GPA). Available residency placements are determined through a detailed process that involves several organizations. The Portuguese Medical Association (PMA) evaluates every public and private hospital, as well as healthcare centers and ''family health units'' of the country, and decides whether they meet the required quality standards and are so accredited to carry on the respective residency training programs. Based on numerous ''metrics'' (such as the number of potential tutors, size of the population served, …), the PMA also states the maximum number of admissible residents in each location, which constitutes the ''backbone'' of the vacancies that are made available to the candidates. This list is then reviewed by governmental organizations responsible for the strategic planning of human resources in the Health System, which then validate the final vacancies young doctors may occupy.
In Portugal, there are about 50 different medical specialties recognized by the PMA, and training program durations range from 4 years (which is the case for GPs, for example) to 6 years (for most surgical areas). Usually, the number of vacancies matches the number of candidates, and comprises about two-thirds of hospital-based positions and one-third of non-hospital-based openings; the vast majority of the latter are destined for GPs (approximately 90%), and the remaining are related with public health and forensic and legal medicine training programs. When the residency program is complete, doctors undergo a final exam and, if approved, are recognized by the PMA as specialists in the respective area of expertise. The contractual relationship that was in place during residency is thus terminated, and new specialists may then apply to permanent positions in national-based recruitment processes for health institutions of the NHS or in the private sector.
In the NHS, these positions are mainly in hospitals (for medical or surgical specialties) and in the primary health care setting. Doctors in primary health care work in the public sector in ''primary health care centers'' and ''family health units '' 4 , which are recently created structures with multi-professional teams of GPs, nurses and allied health professionals who take care of a group of patients (usually, each list has approximately 1900 patients). Patients may register with these GPs, but must choose among the available clinicians within a geographical area, which means that only GPs who do not have a complete list are open to accept new patients. Recent numbers stress that over 1 million Portuguese are not registered with any GP and, therefore, lack a regular primary care contact.
Methodology
The discrete choice experiment Our discrete choice experiment consisted of presenting the respondents with several choice scenarios. In each scenario, the respondent is faced with a choice set containing two different hypothetical medical specialties (specialty A vs specialty B), which are presented as different combinations of attribute levels. Figure 2 shows an example of a choice scenario (with the general instructions) and, in the Supplemental Information, we present a sample of a full questionnaire.
The attributes we used in this study were drawn mainly from the literature, and from our personal experience as junior doctors ourselves, and can be found in Table 1 .
The first attribute is related to practice location. Like Scott et al. [30] and Kolstad [37] , we chose to use a descriptive differentiation between practice location, focusing on the distinction between urban and rural, as well as coastal and inland, which are arguably the main drivers of practice location considering Portugal's geography. Instead of using total number of inhabitants per location [36] , which we found to be more difficult to picture when weighting between two specialties, we combined the description with the distance to an urban center, making it clearer that respondents who chose rural inland would actually be choosing to work in remote areas that were at least 100 km distant from the nearest metropolis.
The second attribute is the work context where junior doctors would be practicing (hospital-based vs non-hospital-based). The NHS is still severely hospital-centered, and the ability to work inside a hospital is still highly valued [38] . Furthermore, this attribute is crucial to differentiate between GP and hospital-based specialties and, subsequently, to draw policy inferences from the estimates.
The next two attributes we used were the expected gross income in the NHS 5 and the total number of hours worked. The earnings attribute is crucial for calculating income elasticities for GPs and hospital specialists and marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) (willingness-to-accept) associated with a (dis)utility change. There is no reliable information on physicians' average earnings in Portugal. 6 Thus, we used the income medical doctors earn after completing their residency as our baseline income level; the following two levels of this attribute were set at the baseline income level ? 500€ and 1000€, respectively (which is equivalent to the salary of a senior doctor, according to the national wage table). As for the total number of hours worked per week, we used the regular contracts that are enforced in Portugal (35 h and 40 h per week), with the exception of the 45 h/week level, which was included on the basis of a hypothetical increase in regular work hours.
Another attribute included in the DCE was the work leaving hours. Control over hours was found to be a highly valued determinant of specialty choice in previous studies [32, 36] . We set the levels of this attribute according to ''predictability of exiting hour'' (predictable and unpredictable) as we felt this would better reflect the nature of (different) medical specialties.
An additional important characteristic in the context of the Portuguese Health System is the opportunity to work in the private sector. Ubach et al. [31] found that opportunities to engage in non-NHS medical work was a crucial factor for physicians in the UK, since it provided them autonomy from the public employer. Barros et al. [38] also point out that additional forms of payment (e.g., overtime and private medical work) constitute an important share of Portuguese doctors' wages.
Similarly to previous studies [29, 32] , we also included the opportunity to engage in academic and research activities as an attribute of our DCE.
The last attribute we incorporated in our model was the on-call work. In previous studies [26, 31, 32] , a reduction in the burden of on-call arrangements was associated with the highest WTP estimates (e.g., in Australia, junior doctors were willing to accept a reduction of 73,000$ (AUS) in annual income to reduce the frequency of on-call duties from 1 in each 4-1 every 10 days, and in Germany [26] one additional on-call arrangement was associated with an additional income of 892€). In our context, on-call work is Junior doctors' medical specialty and practice location choice: simulating policies to… 1017 related only with emergency department (ED) work, and we used the terminology (on-call nights vs on-site nights) that is most widely accepted in Portugal; specifically, onsite nights require the doctor's physical presence in the ED, whereas during on-call nights, doctors only need to go to the hospital if requested by other staff. During the study design process, we also conducted a semi-structured interview with a group of ten junior doctors, focusing on their opinion of the set of attributes that could be relevant for specialty choice within the Portuguese context. We highlight the importance of this qualitative assessment prior to the administration of the DCE, which actually made us rethink our initial attributes and levels. Following Sivey et al. [32] , we first used continuity of care (''regularly see patients more than once'') as a proxy for primary care. However, from this focus group and ad-hoc conversations with colleagues, we found this was not applicable in the context of the Portuguese NHS: continuity of care was more regularly thought of as being associated with hospital outpatient care (e.g., diabetic, renal chronic or cardiologic patients are followed up for years by endocrinologists, nephrologists and cardiologists at the hospital setting) than with GP care, and could lead us to false policy inferences. Other minor adjustments concerned the income gap between levels (which was initially too narrow) and the phrasing of some attributes/levels.
An experimental design was used to create hypothetical medical specialty choices from the attributes and levels presented on Table 1 . Our experiment has eight attributes, four of which had three different levels and another four with two levels, giving a full factorial of 3 4 9 2 4 = 1296 possible distinct choices. We used SAS to develop a D-efficient design, in line with previous studies [30, 37] . This design was specified to have 36 choice sets, grouped into four blocks of nine choice pairs that minimized the correlation between the blocking column and the attribute columns.
Some authors who lack prior information about the relative importance of the several attributes generate the final choice sets by setting the model coefficients to zero. We chose to apply a pilot survey to a sample of 40 junior doctors in order to improve the statistical efficiency of our final SAS design. 7 Using the results of this questionnaire, we estimated a priori coefficients and used them as prior information for generating the final choice sets [39] .
We also included some restrictions in our SAS design, related to choice sets considered to be implausible within the Portuguese context. For instance, we excluded choice sets that simultaneously included: a non-hospital based work context ? any kind of on-call arrangements (on-call nights or on-site nights); or a non-hospital based work context ? an unpredictable control over exiting hours. The final DCE design had a D-error of 0.03. 8 In line with previous studies [30, 32, 36, 37] , we use a forced-choice design, meaning that respondents must choose one of the two hypothetical medical specialties. Including an opt-out option is said to increase realism to DCEs, but in the context of our study, ''remaining in current work'' is impossible since general medical residents are precisely in the transition to specific medical residency (they have to choose a medical specialty to proceed in their career).
In addition to the nine choice sets per block, we included a tenth fixed choice set in each block that compared an hypothetical specialty A, characterized by the ''best'' possible attribute levels (3750€ in income level; 35 h in hours of work per week; etc.), with specialty B that consisted only of the ''worst'' attributes (2750€ in income level; 45 h in hours of work per week; etc.). Hopefully, a ''wrong'' answer to this tenth question (choosing specialty B) may help us cherry-pick respondents who were taking the DCE inattentively or randomly. 9 
Econometric estimation
The analysis of the choice data relies on a random utility model where the utility that junior doctor I derives from choosing specialty j in choice scenario s is given by,
where, X ijs is the set of variables relevant for explaining choice for specialty j, and b represents its coefficients. Expected gross income and work hours are treated as continuous variables, whereas the remaining attributes are dummy-coded, as denoted in Table 1 . In addition to these attributes, we had some socio-demographic and medical education variables (see Table 8 ). To check whether these variables affected our results or not, we interacted some of them with our DCE attributes (see below). All variables concerning geographic location (Residence location before entering medical school, medical school attended, and General Residency Hospital) and Medical Residency placements used in our simulation section (see below) were coded according to the NUTS III classification that was in place in 2014 10 ; further categorization into metropolis and 7 b coefficients were set to zero in the pilot survey since information about the direction of preferences in the Portuguese context is nonexistent. 8 Minimizing D-error is the most common criterion for evaluating DCEs [40] . 9 This 10th choice scenario was only used as an exclusion criterion and not for estimating the model. 10 Some legal documents that regulate territorial nomenclature for statistical purposes are [41, 42] . rural coastal/rural inland locations was performed in accordance to the same criteria used when defining the levels of the respective attributes in the DCE questionnaire.
We also include three dummy variables (representing our four questionnaire blocks) that equal 1 in specialty A, and 0 in specialty B in all ten choice scenarios. This is often used as a test for specification error [29] , i.e., since the two hypothetical medical specialties are distinguishable only by their attributes, the estimated coefficients of these variables should not be statistically significant. Furthermore, since we use one constant term for each block, we also test the balance of our design (whether any block has a specific impact on our results).
Assuming that the e ijs are identically and independently distributed according to extreme value type I, the probability that doctor I chooses specialty A in scenario s, is the probability that U iAs [ U iBs , and is given by:
which is the standard logit and our model (1) .
Logit models such as model (1) are restrictive because they assume junior doctors have identical preferences. Estimating different models allows us to test whether some of our attributes have preference and/or scale heterogeneity, as denoted in previous studies [32, 43] . This is particularly relevant in our study, since some junior doctors may be more willing to choose a hospital-based specialty or an urban practice location regardless of what the other attributes are. 11 Mixed logit models extend the standard logit and account for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences among junior doctors by allowing one or more of the parameters in the model to be randomly distributed (i.e., allowing junior doctors to have different preferences) [43] . This means that the utility in Eq. (1) is now recast as:
where the I subscript on b is added to reflect the fact that b is random across individuals. Thus, the probability that doctor I chooses specialty A in scenario s is,
which is conditional on b I . The unconditional probability of choosing specialty A requires integration of Eq. (4) over the density of f ðbÞ:
12 Hence, in model (2), we estimate a mixed logit model, with expected gross income treated as fixed (b I ¼ bÞ and the remaining attributes allowed to vary (b I 6 ¼ bÞ and specified to be independently normally distributed. If we also allowed the income coefficient to vary with regard to individuals, with a normal distribution, it might imply that some junior doctors could, per se, prefer a job with lower income, which is obviously absurd. Moreover, treating it as fixed makes it easier to calculate WTP estimates for the remaining attributes, since these estimates follow the normal distribution of those attributes. 13 Recent literature has argued that much of the choice heterogeneity may be due not to preference but to scale heterogeneity [45, 46] , which may be seen as the degree to which respondents take the choices more or less ''seriously''. In short, in the presence of scale heterogeneity, the scale of the idiosyncratic error term is greater for some doctors than for others, meaning that these may be choosing ''more randomly''. To account for this, we now let,
where r I is a scaling factor. Following Fiebig et al. [46] , we assume that r I is distributed lognormal with mean normalized to 1 and standard deviation s. Clearly, if s is 0 then the model implied by Eq. (5) collapses to the mixed logit. 14 Now, conditional on b I r I , we can write the probability that doctor I chooses specialty A in scenario s as:
In this sense, we further extend the mixed logit to account for scale heterogeneity, estimating a version of the generalized multinomial logit model (our model 3).
To test if some specific individual characteristics affect junior doctors' choice, we use interaction terms between these characteristics and specific choice attributes in our preferred model. As an example, we are particularly interested in the hypothesis drawn from the literature that rural exposure increases the probability of rural medical practice [3, 34, 35] . In this sense, we interact the rural inland attribute with three variables: Residence location before entering medical school; medical school; and 11 Interacting these attributes with other socio-demographic or medical education variables in a standard logit is unlikely to fully capture preference heterogeneity since some of it may be dependent only on unobservable characteristics (e.g., prejudice or prestige related to a specific specialty/location, specific moral values, etc.). 12 Standard logit is a specific case where the mixing distribution is degenerate at 0 and 1. 13 There is an ongoing debate over the benefits and problems of estimating WTP in preference space (described in the text) and in WTP space (where the model's coefficients directly represent the WTP measures). We compared our model estimates in preference and WTP spaces and found no significant differences between them (data not shown, available upon request). Our models in preference scale have produced very realistic WTP estimates (see below), so we stick with this more widespread methodology [44] . 14 The model presented here is a tractable version of the full GMNL presented in Fiebig et al. [46] . It was estimated in Stata using the userwritten gmnl command [47] .
General Residency Hospital. According to this hypothesis, junior doctors who lived, studied or worked in a rural background may be more willing to practice in a rural location.
The mixed logit and the GMNL were estimated by maximum simulated likelihood with Stata using 1500 Halton draws. Marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) values were calculated for all attributes (except income) for our final model. MWTP for an attribute level is the ratio of the coefficient estimate for that attribute level, and the coefficient estimate for the income attribute. It is interpreted as the income doctors are willing to accept for a change in that attribute level, relative to the baseline level. The 95% confidence limits were calculated using the Krinsky-Robb parametric bootstrap. 15 
Data
Our study uses data from an extensive survey administered to Portuguese junior doctors who were still in the 1-year compulsory general residency (see above) and, in this sense, had not yet chosen their medical specialty and residency placement. Notice that allowing junior doctors to simulate choosing their medical future prior to the actual choice is crucial in our scenario: as reported in previous studies [30, 36] , ''location inertia'' makes it difficult to move doctors to another setting after they settle down and, particularly for Portugal, career changes are uncommon since medical residency is conditional on a strenuous national exam few doctors are willing to retake. It is also worth noting that we decided to apply the questionnaire only after medical graduation, because we believe choices might change after the 1st-year general residency, when residents truly start working and getting a wider and thorough sense of the different medical specialties in a professional context. Besides, some residents have their first opportunity to work in a rural setting, and may therefore be more willing to accept a future career in rural areas. Furthermore, we administered the survey just a few months before the actual choice took place, presumably when junior doctors were already thinking about the final decision they had to make and thus might be more willing to take the task seriously and realistically.
Our universe was therefore the total number of 1st-year general medical residents in Portugal in 2014 (N = 1458). The survey was administered on paper 16 in two ''waves'': first, at the 1st-year general medical residents national conference, held in Covilhã in 2-4 October 2014; second, during the winter of 2014, in each hospital, in order to increase representativeness of groups who were unlikely to attend the meeting (e.g., doctors practicing at more remote areas, like the Portuguese islands or the Algarve).
The DCE formed the main part of the survey, but we also collected some socio-demographics (gender, age, home address, etc.) and medical education variables (medical school, general residency hospital, classification in the National Medical Exam, Medical School GPA, enrollment in research activities during medical school, etc.), to control for specific characteristics and evaluate tailored policies. Table 8 presents the full set of variables used.
Policy simulations
One of the main goals of our study was to be able to draw some policy implications that Portuguese decisionmakers may consider when debating future medical planning policies. In particular, we were interested in the set of attributes that could increase uptake of family doctors, especially in rural areas, both coastal and inland. This is particularly important in our context since previous Government policies that offered such economic incentives have failed to attract young doctors to inland areas.
We built four profiles: one for the ''typical'' hospitalbased specialist and one for the ''typical'' GP in each of the three locations we considered in our DCE-one for a city GP, one for a rural coastal GP and one for a rural inland GP-using different combinations of attribute levels. To choose these attribute levels, we relied on data from the literature [16, 49] and our own experience. For each of these profiles, we calculated the predicted probabilities using the coefficient estimates from our final model. We then used data from the Portuguese Central Health Administration Agency on the 2014 proportions of family doctor and hospital specialists' residency choices in Portugal (i.e., this is the revealedpreference data from the exact same cohort of junior doctors from our DCE) to calibrate our model and capture any unmeasured factors not included in our questionnaire, grounding the predicted probabilities in reality [32, 45] . We did this by generating an iterative process until the three alternative specific constants (ASCs) were adjusted so that the model matched the true proportions of hospital specialists and metropolis, rural coastal and rural inland GPs. 17 15 We used this method to account for any asymmetric WTP distributions [48] . 16 We chose to apply on-site paper questionnaires instead of the easier online modality in order to increase our response rates. We are grateful to our colleagues working at each hospital for helping us with the logistics behind administering a national-level paper-based survey.
Finally, for each of these calibrated scenarios, we simulate how changes in significant attribute levels (policy simulations) may affect the GP vs hospital-based specialist ratio and GP location mix in Portugal.
We selected four different policies, one purely monetary (Policy I), and three that are a different mix of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Table 2 describes the different attribute levels used in each of these policies.
Results
From the total sample of 1458 general medical residents in Portugal, 520 answered our DCE (36%). We excluded 15 respondents who failed to answer ''A'' (the best choice set) in the 10th question (see above), and 2 respondents who did not answer [50% of the questions, so our final sample comprised 503 respondents. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of these junior doctors. In our sample, 69% of junior doctors were women, and the average age was 26 years old. In terms of medical education background, 9% of junior doctors studied abroad, while Portuguese graduates were distributed evenly across the eight medical schools. The average National Medical Exam score was 67%, and the average Medical School GPA 15 (out of 20). Only 16% of junior doctors reported any research activity during medical school. From the available data, our sample is broadly representative of medical residents in Portugal in terms of gender and age, yet slightly under-representative of medical graduates from the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Lisbon [16] .
In Table 4 , we present the estimates from our three models, and a comparison of fit across them. The three models generate similar results, but a comparison between mixed logit/GMNL and the standard logit highlights the importance of taking into account the substantial preference heterogeneity in the various specialty attributes. Between the former, our preferred model is the mixed logit, i.e., it yields lower estimates of Bayesian information criterion (BIC), fitting the data better than the GMNL. Moreover, the value of s is not significantly different from zero, indicating that we failed to find any scale heterogeneity across junior doctors' responses.
As expected, the constant terms are non-significant in every model, meaning that specialty ''A'' was not preferred over ''B'', after netting out the influence of its attributes (we specifically stated in the instructions to the respondents that specialty A and B were meant to be considered equal in everything except for the attributes listed in each choice set). It also underlines that the blocking procedure had no influence in our results.
All but the research opportunities and the on-site ED work over night attributes were significant at the 1% level and had the expected direction. As expected, junior doctors prefer higher salaries, lower working hours, higher predictability over exiting hours, higher opportunities for work outside the NHS and fewer nights oncall. Practice location and context of work attributes have the highest impact on junior doctors' preferences: a rural coastal location has a (mean) disutility of -0.408 and a rural inland location a disutility of -1.449, compared to a practice location in a city, whereas a nonhospital based specialty has a disutility of -1.071, compared to a hospital-based specialty.
In addition to these effects, the utility associated with a rural location and a non-hospital based specialty also had the highest standard deviations, suggesting that availability to practice in rural settings and to pursue a GP career varies greatly across junior doctors.
WTP measures, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between each coefficient and the income coefficient, provide an easier way to interpret the impact of each attribute on junior doctors' choice behavior. A negative value of WTP implies that junior doctors would require an income increase of that amount to move from the reference level of that attribute to the specified level, whereas positive values indicate income losses accepted for a utility increase. Table 5 shows that junior doctors are willing to move to a rural setting, in exchange for a monthly income increase of 341€ or 1154 €, respectively, for a rural coastal or rural inland setting. Work context is also highly valued: doctors would need to be paid 849€ for a change to a non-hospital based specialty. An important valuation is also given to predictability in work leaving hours, i.e., respondents required a 546€ income compensation to have work leaving hours ''unpredictable'' rather than ''predictable''. A slightly lower valuation is given to work opportunities in the private sector: doctors are willing-to-accept an income reduction of 433€ (NHS gross expected income) if ''compensated'' by an increase in private sector work opportunities. 18 Lastly, our estimates show that the marginal value associated with an extra hour of work per week would require an hourly wage of 16,5€, 19 whereas on-call nights would require an income increase of 138€.
In Table 6 , we use interactions between socio-demographic/medical education variables and our DCE attributes to show how these individual characteristics affect 18 In a separate model (data not shown, available upon request), we included ''private work'' and ''income'' as correlated variables, to test whether junior doctors pictured those variables as substitutes. We did not find a statistically significant correlation, which implies that the utility gained from having more ''private work'' is not just related to income factors, but has a value per se. 19 In Table 5 , we show that the MWTP for ''Work hours'' is 66€. Converting the monthly salary into a weekly amount, we have 66€/ 4 = 16,5€. junior doctors' choice. Overall, we found that rural upbringing and rural exposure during general residency had a positive effect on the probability of considering medical practice in a rural background, i.e., the MWTP associated with this move was two-thirds that found for colleagues who did not have a rural upbringing or rural exposure during general residency (944€ and 959€, respectively). Graduation in a rural medical school, however, was not significantly associated with an increase in the probability of a rural practice location. Table 6 also shows that for junior doctors who reported research activity during graduation, the opportunity to engage in research during their professional life is significantly associated with higher utility and with a relatively important valuation (MWTP = 479€).
Finally, we also conducted two sub-analyses: since the Medical National Exam plays an important role in the process of medical specialty choice (see above), we estimated our model according to tertiles of the exam score. Overall, our results (presented as Supplemental Information) show that junior doctors who had higher scores on the exam have slightly higher MWTP values for some attributes, yet the overall significance and direction of our coefficients remains the same. Furthermore, we analysed medical specialty preferences only for those junior doctors who specifically stated in their questionnaires they had a predilection for primary care. Our results (Table 9 ) confirm that these junior doctors value typical primary health care factors: for instance, they value a ''non-hospital based'' context of work, 
Policy analysis
In this section, we use the estimates from our preferred model (mixed logit) in Table 4 to simulate the effects of specific policy interventions. We created four medical specialty profiles-one for hospital specialist, one for a city GP, one for a rural coastal GP and one for a rural inland GP-and tested how these policies would affect the hospital specialist/ GP ratio and the geographic dispersion of GPs. Table 7 presents the attribute levels selected for each profile and the predicted probabilities for our simulations. While the uncalibrated scenario predicted that 56% of junior doctors would choose a hospital specialty, calibrating the model with actual residency placement choices increased the hospital specialist/GP ratio. The bottom half of the table shows how particular policies affect these predicted probabilities; specifically, we estimate that an income incentive (Policy I) increases GP choice probabilities in the rural coastal and inland settings by only 1 and 3 percentage points (p.p.), respectively, while an additional reduction on the work hours for these GPs (Policy II) further increases choice probabilities by 6 p.p. and 3 p.p., respectively. Additional policies that include non-pecuniary factors, such as increasing private work or research opportunities (Policy III), may lead to further increases in choice probabilities to 24 and 14%, respectively, yet at the expense of metropolitan GPs (who reduce their predicted probabilities from 14% to 6%). Conversely, a mixed policy (Policy IV) that also includes incentives for metropolitan GPs (a reduction in work hours) balances GPs across our three geographical locations: it increases GPs in the rural coastal and rural inland areas from 18% to 30% (16% in rural coastal GPs and 14% in rural inland GPs), but keeps the predicted probability of metropolitan GPs unchanged. Figure 3 presents the effect of these incentives graphically and highlights the role that non-monetary factors may play for the rural uptake of GPs. Moreover, it shows the additive effect of monetary and non-monetary incentives, i.e. the difference in predicted probabilities between the orange and red lines (with and without monetary incentives) increases with income. Finally, our simulation allows us to estimate the (implicit) income elasticity for rural inland GPs in Portugal. Policy I predicts that an income increase of 350€ would lead to a 3 p.p. increase in choice probability, which implies an income elasticity of 3.37.
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Discussion
There are nowadays over 1 million Portuguese inhabitants who lack a primary care physician. In this work, we provide an indication that this shortage may be addressed with a careful policy design that mixes pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives. Our Policy IV, which includes such incentives, predicts that junior doctors' choices for a GP career in rural inland and rural coastal areas may increase from 18% to 30%. These simulations also provide unequivocal evidence that Portuguese junior doctors are more responsive to a mix of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors than to mere financial incentives when choosing Table 4 Results from our three models. Mixed logit and GMNL allow preference heterogeneity and assume the normal distribution for all the attributes, except the ''expected gross income'' and the constants. GMNL allows for scale heterogeneity, as denoted by the scale parameter. BIC = -2 9 LL ? ln(N) 9 k, where LL is the loglikelihood, N is the sample size and k is the number of parameters in the model. AIC = -2 9 LL ? 2 9 k, where LL is the log-likelihood and k is the number of parameters in the model their medical specialty and practice location. This finding may help to explain why previous Government policies focused almost exclusively on financial incentives have failed to attract doctors to underserved areas in Portugal.
Although we found high (dis)utilities associated with urban/rural location and with general practice attributes (which is consistent with findings for Australia [30, 32] and Norway [36] ), we also found some non-pecuniary attributes that could counteract these preferences. Portuguese junior doctors would be willing to sacrifice as much as 20% of their monthly income for a better control over leaving hours; for a significant reduction in their workload; or for higher opportunities to undertake non-NHS work. These findings are consistent with those reported in previous studies [31, 32] . Taking into account that we failed to find a significant correlation between private work and income, there seems to be an extra effect beyond income associated with working outside the NHS, which some authors hypothesize that may be attributed to higher levels of professional autonomy [31] . In Portugal there is a legal framework for (private) physician cooperatives to contract primary care services for a specific population, yet this model (known as Family Health Unit type C) has never been put forth, even with some promising experiences from Northern European countries [50, 51] . Pilot testing this solution on these underserved areas may be effective in addressing the imbalance in the geographical distribution of GPs.
Our work, however, still leaves a considerable room for using financial incentives to attract junior doctors to rural areas: our implicit income elasticity for GP rural choice is 3.37, which is higher than previous studies [4, 28, 32] . This apparently higher propensity of Portuguese junior doctors to income variations may be related with the current crisis the country is going through, which led to a substantial income reduction for several civil servants, including medical doctors. In our sample, more than 50% of junior doctors reported they were considering emigrating in the near future, which is uncommon in a profession that has virtually full employment.
There are at least two other policy implications drawn from our work. Firstly, the differences between our uncalibrated and our calibrated models highlight the importance of taking into account revealed-preference data. In our case, incorporating these actual choices is crucial since the market for medical residency is closed and centrally controlled. Our results show that more junior doctors were willing to pursue a GP career than those that actually do, provided there were sufficient residency placements. This may be linked to an increasing recognition of family practice as an established specialty, with growing scientific activity and new organizational structures that provide better remuneration and career prospects than (non-surgical) hospital specialties. Even though GP placements have been steadily increasing in recent years, further increases are still necessary to address the unmet needs of the population and to replace the aging group of current GPs. Hopefully, our work may shed light on how junior doctors would react to such a measure, and suggests possible mechanisms to redirect them to geographical areas in need.
Secondly, we found that some socio-demographic and medical education factors had a differential effect on the choice of specialty. For instance, doctors with a rural background, or that worked temporarily in rural hospitals are more willing to practice in rural areas. This finding may favor a system of 'rural quota', identical to that already in place for Portuguese islanders accessing medical school, and that has been suggested in other works [52] . However, we failed to find a higher predisposal to work in rural areas by junior doctors who studied in rural medical schools. This finding calls for a change in their medical curricula in ways that enhance a better geographical attachment of medical graduates in these rural medical schools. Furthermore, since some subpopulations are particularly predisposed to moving to rural environments, our results suggest that tailored policies at the micro level (e.g., municipal) may be more effective and should be also considered alongside central governmental planning. Similarly, junior doctors who had been involved in research during medical school valued research activities during residency most; therefore, linking specific GP residency placements with research scholarships or university partnerships may be positive to attract some junior doctors to those positions. Methodologically, we have to pinpoint the importance of the preparation phase on DCE studies [53, 54] . As timeconsuming as they may be, informal focus groups made us redesign our study and give the attributes the meaning we were looking for, within the Portuguese context. Besides, the timing of administering the questionnaire is vital: we applied it just a few months before the actual choice of specialty, so most junior doctors were already thinking about their choice and were genuinely interested in taking part in the DCE. This may help to explain why we failed to find any scale heterogeneity (i.e., our GMNL model was not statistically significant) and why only 15 respondents were excluded for failing to answer the best choice in our tenth question. This is important because, although DCEs are an excellent and imaginative way of assessing respondents' preferences, they do not necessarily translate into actual choices. Since we found estimates of MWTP values that are close to other studies and to Portuguese market prices (for instance, we found a marginal wage for an extra hour of work of about 20€, which is acceptable in current Portuguese parameters), we are reassured as to the robustness of our findings.
Another factor that strengthens our conclusions is related to the sub-group analyses performed. Both the results concerning residents with the best scores in the National Exam and those concerning residents with a stated preference for family medicine were consistent with an a priori hypothesis, and thus may be considered as a successful sensitivity analysis. Furthermore, our methodological option of considering a non-hospital based context as a proxy for a GP profile (knowing that, for instance, Public Health is another non-hospital based specialty available for junior doctors) is not only based on the fact that the vast majority of available residency placements outside the hospital setting are related to GP positions (as stated above), but is also clearly reinforced by our findings that the utility (and MWTP) of a nonhospital based context has a reversed sign in the subgroup of people who stated they were more willing to choose a GP career (i.e., these junior doctors who most preferred nonhospital context, unlike our general results).
However, as a final remark, in our study we did not exhaust all factors that may be important in doctors' careers. In particular, we did not include more social (e.g., the degree of social interaction, opportunity careers for spouses and educational privileges for children, housing and infrastructure incentives, etc.) or practice (e.g. type and size of practice, size of patient list, etc.) factors that have been found to have a relevant influence on senior doctors' choice to move to [26, 30] , and to stay in [55] , rural settings. However, our sample was composed of junior doctors who were very young (average age 26 years) and for whom typical family factors related to marriage and children may evolve only later on in their lives. Arguably, evaluating the aforementioned factors at such point in time may be more effective, namely at the end of the medical residency, when there is another major career milestone. That was, however, out of the scope of this work and is left for future research. Fig. 3 Income effect on uptake of GPs (with and without nonmonetary incentives). Note: the graph considers increases in income (in Euros) for rural GPs, while maintaining the baseline profile for city GPs (see Table 7) questionnaires, particularly to the following MDs: Ana Rita Ramos, Research during medical school =1 for junior doctors who participated on research activities during medical school
We followed the criteria for classification of rural areas as described in the text Table 9 Model for junior doctors who referred they were considering a future in Primary Health Care These are the mixed logit results considering only junior doctors who have an inclination for GP ** P \ 0.05, *** P \ 0.01
